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Abstract
Recommendation systems form the center piece of a rapidly growing trillion dollar
online advertisement industry. Even with numerous optimizations and approximations,
collaborative filtering (CF) based approaches require real-time computations involving
very large vectors. Curating and storing such related profile information vectors on web
portals seriously breaches the user’s privacy. Modifying such systems to achieve private
recommendations further requires communication of long encrypted vectors, making the
whole process inefficient. We present a more efficient recommendation system alternative,
in which user profiles are maintained entirely on their device, and appropriate recommen-
dations are fetched from web portals in an efficient privacy preserving manner. We base
this approach on association rules.
1 Introduction
Targeted advertising (TA) uses keywords, their frequencies, link structure of the web, user
interests/demographics, recent/overall buying histories etc. to deliver personalized adver-
tisements [1]. TA is enabled by (unique) cookies (random hash-maps) stored on the user’s
devices [2]. When a cookie is retrieved from it, the web-server storing this string can recall the
profile of the user associated/stored with it at its end. This mechanism constitutes a serious
breach of privacy as it allows the websites to build very elaborate profile of the user at their
end [3, 4, 5]. This leads to the question: can we achieve TA without employing the cookie
mechanism? Any such alternate approach would require the user to maintain their profile on
their own device, and use it for interactively computing and fetching the appropriate TA from
the server. In fact, solving this problem effectively can be considered a highly valuable con-
tribution [6]. We present a solution framework for this very important commercial problem
of wide-spread interest. In the presentation, we focus on the crux of the solution: a privacy
preserving recommendation system.
We present a novel approach for privacy preserving recommendation system (RS), which
shifts most of the computational work to a pre-processing stage. In the query processing phase,
i.e., when we need to provide recommendations to a user according to their profile, most of the
computation is done by the server in our proposed system, while the client merely computes
and exchanges encryptions of a few messages. We will use recommender systems terminology
in the paper, wherein items can also denote ads. Our system is based on selection and
application of association rules (AR), to produce an ordered list of recommended items. ARs
[7] capture the relation that if a user has already bought a set of items p (called the antecedent),
then she is very likely to also buy another set of items q (called the consequent). ARs are mined
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from large databases of historical user purchase data on the server-side, and often filtered to
retain only the most meaningful insights [8]. While CF methods [9] extract and use pairwise
marginal statistics from the joint probability distribution of user preferences over items, ARs
take into account more complex summary statistics of the joint probability distribution, which
capture information about much larger collections of items. Most computation in a CF based
system is done both offline as well as online when the recommendation is computed. However,
ARs are generated at an offline pre-processing stage, and query-processing merely requires
selection and application of the right AR interactively. If done correctly, this process can
have lower communication complexity in a privacy-preserving system. Lastly, note that CF
encounters more bottlenecks when privacy preserving properties are desired: (a) Explicit and
consistent feedback from users are hard to obtain, store, organize and compile, given that
they are to be attached to the right user ID; and (b) the spatio-temporal profiles of users
can change continuously leading to inaccurate targeted recommendations from a CF system.
Because ARs are user-agnostic (they only track population level statistics), they can be more
robust to these two issues.
In order to build a privacy preserving recommendation system using ARs, we first devise
meaningful criteria for selection of the most relevant ARs given a query (user profile) and
to form an ordered list of recommended items. We then present fast exact and approximate
algorithms whose outputs satisfy these criteria. We provide their privacy preserving versions
in which the client does not reveal its profile (we will use the word transaction borrowed from
the AR literature to denote a profile) to the server, and the server does not reveal its database
of ARs to the client. Finally, we present experimental results to demonstrate the practicality
of our solutions, in terms of the latency overheads incurred due to privacy, in e-commerce and
other domains.
Problem Statement and Contributions
There is a client C, which has a set of items, referred to as a transaction set T ∈ 2I , with I
being the universal item set and 2I denoting the power set. The transaction set T represents
the current profile of a user. A server S processes a large historical transaction database and
stores a database of association rules D, in the form of {pi → qi}
|D|
i=1. Here | · | represents
the size of a set/database and pi and qi are sets (belonging to 2
I) that define the ith AR. In
the non-private version of the problem, given a single transaction T , the server S computes
and sends recommended items that are based on consequents of matching association rules,
where matching is defined suitably. For instance, if there are multiple ARs that are applicable
to the transaction, then an ordered list of recommended items is prepared by collating the
items recommended by each of the multiple ARs taking into consideration the (optional)
weights attached to these rules (for instance, these can be lift, conviction, Piatetsky-Shapiro
etc. or directly optimized for recommendation accuracy), or such ordering can also be based
on the items in the input transaction, which may be assigned a weight according to some
monotonously decreasing function of time lapsed since this item was active (e.g., purchased).
In the privacy-preserving version, given an input transaction T , defined as an ordered list of
items, held by the C, and a database of ARs (D) held by the S, the C and S privately and
interactively compute the most relevant item, or ordered list of items, to be recommended to
C.
Below is a list of our contributions:
(1) Criteria: We formulate several criteria for selecting the appropriate set of association
rules. A rule is applicable if its antecedent is contained in the transaction. These criteria are
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differentiated using parameters such as threshold weight w, which is used to eliminate all rules
below the given threshold weight, antecedent length threshold t, which is used to eliminate
all rules above the given length threshold, and parameter k, which is used to select the top-k
association rules under a specified ordering. We relate these criteria to a newly defined set
optimization problem called the Generalized Subset Containment Search (GSCS). We show
how the GSCS problem is a strict super-set of the well known Maximum Inner Product Search
(MIPS) criterion [10].
(2) Algorithms: We develop efficient exact and approximate algorithms for computing
recommended items based on the criteria above. Exact implementations build on a novel two-
level hashing based data structure that stores the ARs in a manner so that their antecedents
can be appropriately matched, and corresponding consequent(s) can be efficiently fetched.
The key benefit of the data structure is that it provides a weak form of privacy by itself,
and is readily amenable to the privacy protocols mentioned below. Our implementations
are parallelizable, and can exploit multi-threading machines. We also design a novel fast
randomized approximation algorithm for GSCS that fetches applicable ARs based on Locality
Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [11] and hashing based algorithms for MIPS [12].
(3) Privacy-preserving 2-party Protocols: Next, we design communication efficient
privacy preserving protocols corresponding to the above exact and approximate algorithms.
These protocols are based on oblivious transfer and straightforward to implement. Further,
the protocol for the approximation algorithm can be easily extended to embed many other
large scale data processing tasks that rely on LSH (for instance, record linkage, data cleaning
and duplicity detection problems [13] to name a few). Finally, we extensively evaluate the
impact that adding privacy has in terms of latency in recommending items. We emphasize
that these latencies are manageable for reasonably sized databases (e.g., ∼ 104 ARs, see Sec-
tion 6) and practical for certain targeted advertising settings. We do note that achieving
truly web-scale targeted advertising (100− 1000X larger problem instances) under the design
choices made in our ARs based recommendation system, while not impossible, would need
further research.
Related Work
The GSCS problem introduced in Section 3 is similar to other popular search problems on
sets including the Jaccard Similarity (JS) problem, and vector space problems such as the
Nearest-Neighbor (NN) and the Maximum Inner Product Search (MIPS) problems. For these
related problems, solutions based on hashing techniques such as LSH are already available. For
instance, one can find a set maximizing Jaccard Similarity with a query set using a technique
called Minhash. The NN problem can be addressed using L2LSH [11] and variants. The
MIPS problem can be solved approximately using methods such as L2-ALSH(SL) [10] and
Simple-LSH [12] among others. Note that the GSCS problem is different from all of these,
and also different from the similar sounding Maximum Containment Search problem defined
in [13]. The problem in [13] is equivalent to the MIPS problem while the former is not. In this
paper, we give a new approximate algorithm to the GSCS problem using hashing techniques
listed above.
Privacy preserving recommendation systems have been well studied in the past. For
instance, privacy based solutions for different types of collaborative filtering systems have
been proposed in [14, 15, 16]. Roughly in that setting, the problem reduces to computing the
dot product of a matrix with a vector of real numbers, where the (recommendation) matrix
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is possessed by the server and the client possesses the vector, and both the client and the
server are interested in preserving the privacy of their data. Since embedding such schemes
into a privacy protocol based on cryptography is difficult, many solutions resort to data
modification and adding noise. For instance, in [17], the authors propose a perturbation based
method for preserving privacy in data mining problems. This approach is only applicable when
one is interested in aggregate statistics and does not work when more fine-grained privacy
is needed. In [18], the authors propose a decentralized distributed storage scheme along
with data perturbation to achieve certain notions of privacy in the collaborative filtering
setting. For the same setting, a method based on perturbations is also proposed in [19]
and [20]. In the paper [21], the authors proposed a theoretical approach for a system called
Alambic which splits customer data between the merchant and a semi-trusted third party. The
security assumption is that these parties do not collude to reveal customers’ data. A major
difference between our work and all these solutions is that we base our privacy solutions on
cryptographic primitives (notably oblivious transfer) and build specific protocols that work
with association rules. This is attractive because ARs are already heavily used in practice
for exploratory analysis in the industry. In particular, we propose one of the first practical
distributed privacy preserving protocols for recommendation systems based on selection and
application association rules. Note that privacy has also been well studied in the context
of generation of association rules from historical transaction data [22, 23], but not much for
the problem of their selection and application in a recommendation or targeted advertising
context.
Our work is closely related to the literature on secure two-party computation [24, 25]. In
this model, two players with independent inputs want to compute a function of the union of
their inputs while not revealing their own inputs to the other party. GMW and Yao [26, 27]
prove feasibility of secure two party computation (assuming honest-but-curious parties) and
are based on a Boolean circuit computing the desired function, although because of their
generality, they require a lot of communication. On the other hand, specialized protocols (for
instance, our private protocols) for promiment classes of problems (for instance, targeted ad-
vertising or recommendations) are worth designing because they can reduce privacy overheads
considerably. Similar to these protocols, our solutions also implement the same functionality
as a trusted third party. Secure sorting is integral part of our solution, and has been previ-
ously studied in the literature [28]. Note that our work is also distinct from Trusted Execution
Environments (TEE) such as Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone etc. The latter provide the integrity
and secrecy of computation by placing all executions on the isolated encrypted memory. Our
work addresses not just the resultant secure two-party computation problem, but also allows
dealing with large number of association rules via LSH based indexing, which sets its apart
from the rest of the literature. Because LSH based retrieval is similar to a standard database
query retrieval problem, we are able to design privacy protocols for approximate retrieval as
well as exact retrieval of item recommendations using the same primitives. These protocols
consider only honest-but-curious type of corruptions of the involved parties, in which the par-
ties cannot deviate from the main protocol, but can try to glean whatever extra information
they can using the transcripts of execution of the protocol.
Overview
In Sections 2, we present different criteria for the selection of applicable association rules,
assuming that the rules have been mined beforehand from historical transaction data on the
server-side. While the rules could be mined in a privacy preserving manner as well, we sidestep
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this aspect here (see related works above for prior solutions for this). While the accuracy (or
any other information retrieval measure) of the recommendations will be dependent on the
rule mining step in conjunction with the selection criteria, we take a decoupled approach
in this paper to isolate the impact of introducing privacy on the recommendation system
at query-time. So for the first step, we assume that an off-the shelf rule miner (such as
SPMF that implements Apriori/FPGrowth) has already been used to generate rules, and for
the second step, we proceed with designing rule selection criteria optimized for query-time
performance. In this setting, rules can be optimized for recommendation performance in the
first step itself by assuming a weighted decision-list model class and optimizing the weights
of the model by minimizing a suitable recommendation error. A rule with a higher weight
can signify higher importance and should be considered first while recommending, and our
selection criteria take this into account while fetching the most applicable ARs (see ordering
functions in Section 2). We present new approximate and exact algorithms that implement the
proposed criteria in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. We then develop their privacy preserving
counterpart protocols in Section 5. In Section 6 we describe experimental evaluations that
validate the practicality of the proposed algorithms and their privacy preserving versions in
moderate-scale recommendation systems. It is important to note that neither AR based nor
CF based recommendations can dominate each other in terms of recommendation quality, and
their performances depend on the specific datasets. Hence, we don’t pursue this comparison
in this paper. Our conclusions are presented in Section 7.
2 Recommendation Criteria
We have a set of D association rules {pi → qi}
|D|
i=1 with pi, qi ∈ 2
I , and additional attributes
(for instance, a weight attribute wi could denote an interestingness measure or the rule’s
importance in recommendation quality). Given a query transaction T ∈ 2I of the client, we
perform two steps: a Fetch operation followed by a Collate operation. We propose multiple
criteria for deciding which association rules should be fetched. We also define a search problem
called the Generalized Subset Containment Search (GSCS) and relate it to one of the
criteria. Our algorithm in Section 3 solves the GSCS problem in a computationally efficient
albeit approximate manner. In Section 4, we give linear-time query and space efficient exact
algorithms that are easily adaptable to a private protocol design in Section 5.
Fetch Step: Selection of Rules
We define that an association rule i is applicable to a transaction T if and only if pi ⊆ T .
The selection criteria are differentiated based on parameters such as threshold weight w ∈ Z+,
which is used to eliminate all applicable association rules below the threshold weight, t ∈ Z+,
which is used to eliminate rules with antecedent lengths greater than t, and k ∈ Z+, which is
used to select the top-k association rules according to a predefined notion of ordering specified
using an ordering function f : {1, ...,D} → Z.
Ordering Functions. The function f determines which of the applicable rules are the top
k rules. We can define f such that rules can be ordered according to: (a) their weights wi
(e.g., f(i) = wi), or (b) antecedent lengths |pi| (e.g., f(i) = |pi|) or, (c) a combination of both
(e.g., f(i) = g1(wi)+ g1(wmax) · g2(|pi|), where g1 and g2 are strictly monotonic integer-valued
functions and wmax = maxi=1,..,|D|wi). For a pair of rules with antecedents p1 and p2 and
weights w1 and w2, this latter function has the following properties: (i) If |p1| < |p2|, then
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f(1) ≤ f(2), and (ii) If |p1| = |p2| and w1 ≤ w2, then f(1) ≤ f(2). Another example of a
combination ordering function is f(i) = g2(|pi|) + g2(|I|) · g1(wi), which prefers weights first
and then lengths in case of ties.
The Criteria. The TOP-Assoc(k,w, t, f) criterion outputs a set of applicable rules base
on three parameters and an ordering function f . Parameter w filters out rules with weights
≤ w. Parameter t retains rules with antecedents of length ≤ t. Parameter k ∈ Z+ controls the
number of applicable rules that are finally output. We can write the following optimization
formulation representing this criterion as follows: maxx∈{0,1}|D|
∑|D|
i xi · f(i) such that∑
i xi ≤ k, and xi ≤ min{1[|pi| ≤ t],1[wi ≥ w],1[pi ⊆ T ]}. Here, xi is a binary decision
variable that can take a value in {0, 1} and indicates whether an applicable rule is selected.
The inequality xi ≤ min{1[|pi| ≤ t],1[wi ≥ w],1[pi ⊆ T ]} is a mathematical programming
notation for the following constraint: set variable xi to 1 if and only if |pi| ≤ t, wi ≥ w and
pi ⊆ T . The term 1[expr] denotes an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the expr is
true, and 0 otherwise. Since xi is constrained to be less than the minimum of three indicator
functions, it can only take a value 1 if all three evaluate to 1. Otherwise, xi has to necessarily
take the value 0.
TOP-1-Assoc(f) criterion is a special case of TOP-Assoc(k,w, t, f) where k = 1, w = 0
and t = |I|. And TOP-K-Assoc(k, f) criterion is the special setting where w = 0 and
t = |I|. ALL-Assoc(w, t) criterion is another special case where k = |D|, in which case f
does not matter. Finally, under the ANY-Assoc(k,w, t) criterion, the output contains at
most k applicable association rules with weights ≥ w and rule antecedent lengths ≤ t. The
corresponding optimization formulation is maxx∈{0,1}|D|
∑
i xi such that
∑
i xi ≤ k, and
xi ≤ min{1[|pi| ≤ t],1[wi ≥ w],1[pi ⊆ T ]}. To summarize, TOP-Assoc, TOP-1-Assoc,
TOP-K-Assoc, ALL-Assoc, and ANY-Assoc are some of the selection criteria we propose.
Generalized Subset Containment Search. The TOP-1-Assoc(f) criterion with an f()
that (all else being equal) prefers longer applicable rules leads to two new search problems:
(a) the Largest Subset Containment Search (LSCS) problem, and (b) its generalization, the
Generalized Subset Containment Search (GSCS) problem.
Notation: Until now, we used pi, qi and T to denote item sets (and | · | denotes their size).
With a slight abuse of notation, we will also denote their set characteristic vectors with the
same symbols. A set characteristic vector has its coordinates equal to 1 if the items are present
in the set, and 0 otherwise. Thus, in this case, pi, qi and T are also binary valued vectors in
the |I|-dimensional space. Also, we denote the jth coordinate of pi as p
j
i , where 1 ≤ j ≤ |I|,
and the ℓ1-norm of pi as ‖pi‖1. The meaning of the symbols will be hopefully clear from the
context, and will also be reiterated as needed.
Largest Subset Containment Search: The problem max1≤i≤|D|
∑|I|
j=1 T
j · pji subject to p
j
i ≤
T j for 1 ≤ j ≤ |I|, attempts to find a set (i.e., a set characteristic vector) whose inner
product with the set characteristic vector T is the highest among all sets that are subsets of
T . It is related to the TOP-1-Assoc(f) criterion for certain ordering functions as shown
below.
Lemma 1. When f(i) ∝ |pi| for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|, the TOP-1-Assoc(f) criterion is equivalent
to the LSCS problem.
The above lemma holds because if pi ⊆ T , then |pi| is equal to
∑|I|
j=1 p
j
iT
j , which is the
objective of LSCS. This connection to LSCS allows us to design a sub-linear time (i.e., o(|D|))
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randomized approximate algorithm for fetching ARs (see Section 3) under the TOP-1-Assoc
criterion (with appropriately chosen f) if we can come up with such algorithms for the LSCS
problem. And the way we achieve this is by building on fast unconstrained inner-product
search techniques [12] that solve the Maximum Inner Product Search (MIPS) problem, which
is the following problem. Given a collection of “database” vectors ri ∈ R
d, 1 ≤ i ≤ |D| and
a query vector s ∈ Rd (d is the dimension), find a data vector maximizing the inner product
with the query: r∗ ∈ argmax1≤i≤|D|
∑d
j=1 r
j
i s
j.
MIPS and LSCS are not equivalent to each other. To see this, consider the following MIPS
instance constructed to mimic an LSCS instance. Let d = |I|. Let ri be equal to normalized
antecedent vectors: ri =
1
‖pi‖1
pi with pi ∈ {0, 1}
|I| for 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|, and let query s be equal to
the set characteristic vector T ∈ {0, 1}|I|. The normalization in the definition of ris ensures
that smaller length antecedents are preferred in the MIPS instance in order to mimic the
subset containment or ‘applicable’ property. Let pLSCS and pMIPS be the optimal solutions of
the LSCS and MIPS instances constructed above. Then the following statements hold.
Lemma 2. (1) [LSCS feasible implies MIPS optimal] If the LSCS instance is feasible (i.e.,
there exists at least one p such that pj = 0 for all j where T j = 0), then all feasible solutions
of LSCS instance are optimal for the MIPS instance. (2) [MIPS optimal does not imply LSCS
optimal] If there exist p1, p2 such that ‖p1‖1 < ‖p2‖1 such that p
j
1 = 0 and p
j
2 = 0 for all j
where T j = 0, then p1 (as well as p2) is optimal for the MIPS instance but is not optimal for
the LSCS instance.
In other words, part (1) implies that if the LSCS instance is feasible, then there exists
an optimal solution pMIPS for the constructed MIPS instance that has p
j
MIPS = 0 for all
coordinates where T j = 0. Part (2) implies that the optimal solutions of the MIPS instance
are potentially feasible for the LSCS instance if they satisfy a condition. However, there is
no guarantee that they will be optimal for the LSCS problem. In the worst case, there could
be as many as O(2|T |) optimal solutions for the MIPS instance but only a unique solution for
the LSCS instance.
Generalized Subset Containment Search: LSCS can be generalized to get the GSCS problem,
which is as follows: max1≤i≤|D| f
′(i) ·
∑|I|
j=1 T
j · pji subject to p
j
i ≤ T
j for 1 ≤ j ≤ |I|, where
f ′(i) is an ordering function. When f ′(i) = 1, this is LSCS. In other words, for LSCS the
ordering determining the top is not dependent on attributes such as the weight wi and is
only dependent on the antecedent length (through the inner product term in the objective).
On the other hand, GSCS can account for arbitrary ordering functions, especially when such
functions capture task specific meaning (such as being related to recommendation accuracy
for instance). Since the GSCS problem is more general, it is clear that the GSCS and the
MIPS problems are also different.
Collate Step: Item Recommendations
Once we have generated a set L of applicable association rules according to one of the criteria
described above (assumed non-empty, otherwise we return a predefined list such as the list of
globally most frequent items), we can compile a list of item recommendations in the following
two ways:
Uncapacitated setting : We simply return the union of consequent(s) qi of the association rules
in L; however, this list can be potentially large.
Capacitated setting : The client may have a constraint k′ << |I| on the number of items it can
recommend to the user. In this case, we derive associated weights w˜j for each item j ∈ ∪i∈L qi
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by adding up the weights wi of the rules where item j is in the consequent qi. The list of
recommended items are then sorted according to these accumulated weights. If the bound
k′ < | ∪i∈L qi|, we return the top k
′ items from this sorted list, else we return all the items.
3 Approximate Algorithms
We give approximate randomized algorithms that allow for sublinear time fetching of appli-
cable association rules under two different criteria: TOP-1-Assoc and TOP-K-Assoc. We
first introduce the basics of locality sensitive hashing that will be key to the design of our
algorithms. Next, we propose our first algorithm for the TOP-1-Assoc(f) criterion. And
finally, we show how selecting rules for the TOP-K-Assoc can be reduced to finding solutions
for multiple instance of the former allowing us to reuse the data structure construction and
query processing steps.
Hashing based Data Structures for Rule Retrieval
LSH [29, 30] is a technique for finding vectors from a known set of vectors that are most ‘similar’
to a given query vector in an efficient manner (using randomization and approximation). We
will use it to solve MIPS and GSCS problems associated with the criteria mentioned above.
The method uses hash functions that have the following locality-sensitive property.
Definition 1. A (r, cr, P1, P2)-sensitive family of hash functions (h ∈ H) for a metric space
(X, d) satisfies the following properties for any two points p, q ∈ X:
• If d(p, q) ≤ r, then PrH[h(q) = h(p)] ≥ P1, and
• If d(p, q) ≥ cr, then PrH[h(q) = h(p)] ≤ P2.
LSH solves the nearest neighbor problem via solving a near-neighbor problem defined
below.
Definition 2. The (c, r)-NN (approximate near neighbor) problem with failure probability
f ∈ (0, 1) is to construct a data structure over a set of points P that supports the following
query: given point q, if minp∈P d(q, p) ≤ r, then report some point p
′ ∈ P ∩ {p : d(p, q) ≤ cr}
with probability 1− f . Here, d(q, p) represents the distance between points q and p according
to a metric that captures the notion of neighbors. Similarly, the c-NN (approximate nearest
neighbor) problem with failure probability f ∈ (0, 1) is to construct a data structure over a set
of points P that supports the following query: given point q, report a c-approximate nearest
neighbor of q in P (i.e., return p′ such that d(p′, q) ≤ cminp∈P d(p, q)) with probability 1− f .
The following theorem states that we can construct a data structure that solves the ap-
proximate near neighbor problem in sub-linear time.
Theorem 1 ([30] Theorem 3.4). Given a (r, cr, P1, P2)-sensitive family of hash functions,
there exists a data structure for the (c, r)-NN (approximate near neighbor problem) over
points in the set P (with |P | = N) such that the time complexity of returning a result is
O(nNρ/P1 log1/P2 N) and the space complexity is O(nN
1+ρ/P1). Here ρ =
log 1/P1
log 1/P2
. Further,
the failure probability is upper bounded by 1/3 + 1/e.
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The failure probability above can be changed to any desired value through amplification.
The data structure is as follows [29]: we employ multiple hash functions to increase the
confidence in reporting near neighbors by amplifying the gap between P1 and P2. The number
of such hash functions is determined by parameters L1 and L2. We choose L2 functions of
dimension L1, denoted as gj(q) = (h1,j(q), h2,j(q), · · · hL1,j(q)), where ht,j with 1 ≤ t ≤ L1, 1 ≤
j ≤ L2 are chosen independently and uniformly at random from the family of hash functions.
The data structure for searching points with high similarity is constructed by taking each
point x (in our setting, these would be the set characteristic vectors of antecedents) and
storing it in the location (bucket) indexed by gj(x), 1 ≤ j ≤ L2. When a new query point q
is received, gj(q), 1 ≤ j ≤ L2 are calculated and all the points from the search space in the
buckets gj(q), 1 ≤ j ≤ L2 are retrieved. We then compute the similarity of these points with
the query vector in a sequential manner and return any point that has a similarity greater
than the specified threshold r. We also interrupt the search after finding the first L3 points
including duplicates (this is necessary for the guarantees in Theorem 1 to hold). Choosing
L1 = logN , L2 = N
ρ and L3 = 3L2 allows for sublinear query time. The storage space for
the data structure is O(nN1+ρ), which is not too expensive (we need O(nN) space just to
store the points).
The following theorem states that an approximate nearest neighbor data structure can be
constructed using an approximate near neighbor data structure.
Theorem 2 ([30] Theorem 2.9). Let P be a given set of N points in a metric space, and let
c, f ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ ( 1N , 1) be parameters. Assume we have a data-structure for the (c, r)-
NN (approximate near neighbor) problem that uses space S and has query time Q and failure
probability f . Then there exists a data structure for answering c(1 +O(γ))-NN (approximate
nearest neighbor) problem queries in time O(Q logN) with failure probability O(f logN). The
resulting data structure uses O(S/γ log2N) space.
Instead of using the data structure above, below we will use a slightly sub-optimal data
structure (see Approx-GSCS-Prep) but amenable to private protocols (Section 5) as follows:
We create multiple near neighbor data structures as described in Theorem 1 using different
threshold values (r) but with the same success probability 1−f (by amplification for instance).
When a query vector is received, we calculate the near-neighbors using the hash structure with
the lowest threshold. We continue checking with increasing value of thresholds till we find
at least one near neighbor. Let r˜ be the first threshold for which there is at least one near
neighbor. This implies that the probability that we don’t find the true nearest neighbor is at
most f because the near neighbor data structure with the threshold r˜ has success probability
1− f . If the different radii in the data structures are not too far apart so that not too many
points are retrieved, we can still get sublinear query times.
Solving for TOP-1-Assoc(f)
For the TOP-1-Assoc criterion, our goal is to return a single rule whose antecedent set
is contained within the query set T (applicable) and whose f(i) is the highest among such
applicable rules. Our algorithm solves the GSCS formulation of this criterion by constructing
a corresponding approximating MIPS instance, and solving it using locality sensitive hashing
(LSH) based techniques[12].
Our scheme has two parts: (a) Preprocessing state involving Approx-GSCS-Prep (Algo-
rithm 1), and (b) Query stage involving Approx-GSCS-Query (Algorithm 3). In Approx-
GSCS-Prep, the algorithm prepares a data structure based on all rules that can be efficiently
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searched at query time to obtain applicable association rules. In Approx-GSC-Query, the
algorithm takes a transaction T and outputs the rule that satisfies the TOP-1-Assoc(f)
criteria via a linear-scan (worse case O(2|T |)).
Pre-processing Stage. The GSCS instance for obtaining applicable rules is: max1≤i≤|D| f(i)·∑|I|
j=1 p
j
iT
j such that pji ≤ T
j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|, 1 ≤ j ≤ |I|. Since a GSCS instance cannot
be transformed exactly to an MIPS instance as detailed in Section 2, we create an approxi-
mating MIPS that results in a set of candidate rules that contain the rule which is optimal
for the TOP-1-Assoc criterion. From these rules, we prune for the one that satisfies the
TOP-1-Assoc(f) criterion by evaluating the ordering function at query time (see below).
The approximate MIPS instance we construct is as follows: max1≤i≤|D|
1
‖pi‖1
·
∑|I|
j=1 p
j
iT
j,
where we have replaced the hard constraints related to subset containment with a proxy
scaling coefficient. The effect of the coefficient is that it prefers applicable antecedents with
small antecedent length, which ensures that the chosen rule obeys the original containment
constraint (see Lemma 2). The objective of the MIPS instance can be viewed as an inner
product between two real vectors, where the first vector is 1‖pi‖1 pi. Let vector p
′
i =
1
‖pi‖1
pi ∈
R
|I|, which satisfies ‖p′i‖2 ≤ 1. This re-parameterization achieves two things: (a) using p
′
i
in the MIPS instance has the same effect as using 1‖pi‖1 pi, and (b) its ℓ2 norm is smaller
than 1, allowing us to apply the technique proposed in [12] to build our data structure using
Approx-GSCS-Prep. This algorithm (shown in Algorithm 1) uses Simple-LSH-Prep (see
Algorithm 2, proposed in [12]) to create the desired data structure that allows for sublinear
time querying of applicable association rules.
Our scheme also works on the LSH principle described above. The subroutine that we use,
namely Simple-LSH-Prep (Algorithm 2), relies on the inner product similarity measure and
comes with corresponding guarantees on the retrieval quality. To construct a data structure for
fast retrieval, it uses hash functions parameterized by spherical Gaussian vectors a ∼ N (0, I)
such that ha(x) = sign(a
Tx) (sign() is a scalar function that outputs +1 if its argument is
positive and 0 otherwise).
Given the scaled p′i vectors, Simple-LSH-Prep constructs a data structure DS as follows.
It defines a mapping P for vector x ∈ {x ∈ R|I| : ‖x‖2 ≤ 1} as: P (x) =
[
x;
√
1− ‖x‖22
]
∈ R|I|+1. Then, for any p′i, due to our scaling, we have ‖P (p
′
i)‖2 = 1. Let T
′ = 1‖T ‖2T
be the scaled version of the transaction T . Then, for any scaled vector p′i and T
′ we have
the following property: P (p′i)
TP (T ′) = 1‖pi‖1
∑|I|
j=1 p
j
iT
′j, where ()T represents the transpose
operation. This implies that the inner product in the space defined by the mapping P is equal
to our MIPS instance objective. Further, in this new space, maximizing inner product is the
same as minimizing Euclidean distance. Thus, using the hash functions {ha} defined earlier
to perform fast Euclidean nearest neighbor search achieves doing an inner product search in
the original space defined by the domain of P ().
Let the approximation guarantee for the nearest neighbor obtained be 1 + ν (e.g., set the
parameters of the data structure in Theorem 2 such that it solves the (1 + ν)-NN problem).
Then the following straightforward relation gives the approximation guarantee for the MIPS
problem.
Lemma 3. If we have an 1 + ν solution x to the nearest neighbor problem for vector y, then
1 + (1 + ν)2(maxp∈P p · y − 1) ≤ x · y ≤ maxp∈P p · y.
Simple-LSH-Prep uses multiple parameters, including concatenation parameters {Km}
M
m=1,
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and repetition parameters {Lm}
M
m=1 (these are determined by a sequence of increasing radii
{rm}
M
m=1 needed for the nearest-neighbor problem, see above). For every m, Simple-LSH-
Prep picks a sequence of Km ·Lm hash functions from {ha} and gets a Km ·Lm dimensional
signature for each vector P (p′i) ∈ R
|I|+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|. These signatures and the chosen hash
functions (across all radii) are output as DS.
Algorithm 1: Approx-GSCS-Prep({pi}
|D|
i=1
)
Input: D rules with antecedents pi ∈ {0, 1}|I|.
Output: Data Structure DS containing rule representations and hashing constants
1 begin
2 Do parallel{
3 forall i = 1, ..., |D| do
4 p′i ←
1
‖pi‖1
pi
5 }End parallel
6 DS ← Simple-LSH-Prep({p′i}
|D|
i=1)
7 return DS
Query Stage. Given a transaction T , Approx-GSCS-Query queries Simple-LSH-Query
(see Algorithm 4) to obtain rules that are applicable. Simple-LSH-Query solves the ap-
proximating MIPS problem in sub-linear time by filtering out the most similar neighbors of
transaction vector T from the set {p′i : 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|}. It does this by constructing the vector
[T ; 0] ∈ R|I|+1 and getting (for each m = 1, ...,M sequentially) its Km · Lm dimensional sig-
nature with the same hash functions as used before for p′i vectors. Then it collects rules that
share the same signature as the transformed transaction vector (it stops this process at the
first m for which it is able to find a rule). In particular, it ensures that the signatures agree
in at least one Km-length chunk out of the Lm chunks. Appropriate choices of Km and Lm
(which do not depend on the number of rules |D|) allows for retrieval of the top candidates
with high approximation quality. Approx-GSCS-Query processes this candidate list to get
the top rule in terms of the ordering function f . This is a linear search with worst case time
complexity O(2|T |). In case the candidate list is empty, it returns a predefined baseline rule.
Note that scaling T to T ′ = 1‖T ‖2T before passing it to transformation map P () is not
necessary at query time. This is because, Given a Gaussian vector a ∈ Rd+1 and a transaction
vector T ∈ {0, 1}d, sign(aTP ( T‖T ‖2 )) = sign(a
T [T ; 0]). The advantage of this change is that we
do not have to work with a real-valued vector at query time, leading to an efficient oblivious
transfer (OT) step in the privacy preserving counterpart protocol that embeds this method
(see Section 5 for more details).
Solving for TOP-K-Assoc(k, f)
The approximate algorithm above can be adapted to the TOP-K-Assoc criterion due to a
reduction from the approximate k-nearest neighbor problem and the approximate 1-nearest
neighbor problem (the reduction and its analysis are due to Sariel Har-Peled, 2018). The
reduction is as follows. Given database D and the parameter k, we construct N = k log |D|
copies of the database (D1, ...,DN ) where in each database, every rule is included with a
constant probability 1/k. Given these N databases, we apply Approx-GSCS-Prep to each
to generate DS1, ...,DSN . When we want to run a query T to get the top-k applicable
association rules according to an ordering function f , we seek the most highly applicable rule
from each of the data structures using Approx-GSCS-Query. Once we retrieve N highly
applicable rules, we then prune this list by linear scanning and sorting to obtain the top-k
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Algorithm 2: Simple-LSH-Prep({vi}
|D|
i=1)
Input: Vectors vi ∈ Rd for 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|.
Output: Data structure DS capturing the hash functions and the hash signatures of input ARs
1 begin
2 Preprocessing: Generate Hash functions
3 G ← φ
4 Do parallel{
5 forall m = 1, ...,M do
6 forall l = 1, ..., Lm do
7 forall k = 1, ...,Km do
8 a ∈ Rd+1 ∼ N (0, I)
9 G[m, l, k]← a
10 }End parallel
11 Preprocessing: Hash data vectors
12 Define P (x) =
[
x;
√
1− ‖x‖22
]
for x ∈ {x ∈ Rd : ‖x‖2 ≤ 1}
13 H ← φ
14 Do parallel{
15 forall 1 ≤ i ≤ |D| do
16 forall m = 1, ...,M do
17 forall 1 ≤ l ≤ Lm do
18 index← φ
19 forall 1 ≤ k ≤ Km do
20 if G[m, l, k]TP (vi) ≥ 0 then
21 index.append(1)
22 else
23 index.append(0)
24 H[m, l, index].add(i)
25 }End parallel
26 DS ← (G,H)
27 return DS
rules. This reduction increases the query time roughly by a factor that is linear in k and
logarithmic in the number of rules |D|.
An intuitive argument for the reduction (Anastasios Sidiropoulos, 2018) is the following:
Let X be the set of k-nearest neighbors (rules satisfying the given criterion) to the query T .
When sampling a subset of the rules, for any x ∈ X, with probability Θ(1/k), we include x
and exclude every other rule in X. The specified number of sampled copies of the database
D are just enough to recover the top-k rules with high probability, even when there are
approximations.
4 Exact Algorithms
For exact retrieval of applicable association rules according to any of the criteria in Section
2, we essentially perform a linear scan over all rules, filter them according to the appropriate
thresholds and sort them according to the given ordering function. Our main contribution
here is a two-level data structure to store the ARs that has two attractive properties: (a)
It can efficiently store the rules for fetching quickly (in terms of the overall communication
complexity and computational complexity needed), and (b) the data structure is easy to
privatize for use in a privacy-preserving protocol (see Section 5). The data structure (denoted
as H) is common to exact implementations of all the criteria specified in Section 2. We
describe the data structure in a generic way for retrieval of strings. Adapting the notion of
strings to rules (and their attributes) in our setting is straightforward.
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Algorithm 3: Approx-GSCS-Query(T ,DS, f)
Input: Data structure DS from Approx-GSCS-Prep, query T ∈ {0, 1}|I|
Output: Top most rule according to ordering function f
1 begin
2 Set S ← φ
3 S ← Simple-LSH-Query(T ,DS)
4 if S = φ then
5 return a pre-defined default rule
6 Set S′ ← φ
7 Set fval ← 0
8 forall i ∈ {i : p′i ∈ S} do
9 if f(i) ≥ fval then
10 S′ ← {pi → qi}
11 fval ← f(i)
12 return S′
Algorithm 4: Simple-LSH-Query(u,DS)
Input: Query u ∈ Rd, data structure DS
Output: Vector(s) with high inner products with query u
1 begin
2 G,H ← DS
3 Query:
4 forall m = 1, ...,M do
5 Set S ← φ
6 forall 1 ≤ l ≤ Lm do
7 index← φ
8 forall 1 ≤ k ≤ Km do
9 if G[m, l, k]T [u; 0] ≥ 0 then
10 index.append(1)
11 else
12 index.append(0)
13 S.add(H[m,l,index])
14 if |S| > 3Lm then
15 break
16 if S 6= φ then
17 return S
18 return S
Pre-processing Stage
Consider a database D of strings, with each string of maximum length M (i.e., each string
is a sequence of symbols from some ground set Σ). We generate a data structure H that
stores these strings using Exact-Fetch-Prep (Algorithm 5). The structure is an adaptation
of [31], but unlike [31] it is symmetric and has two levels. By symmetric we mean that a fixed
hash function (hr) will be chosen for hashing all elements at the first level, and another
hash function (hs) is chosen for hashing all elements at the second level. Such a choice
helps with the complexity of oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in Section 5, where we will
essentially use the same data structure. That is, using the same data structure, the client
can compute encrypted indices on its end with the knowledge of (hr, hs) and can use OT
to retrieve objects, and efficient implementations for this already exist in practice. The hash
functions map elements from [|D|] (for a numberN the notation [N ] represents the set 1, ..., N )
to a range of size L = 16 · |D|, and are chosen randomly from a 2-Universal hash function
family [32] H2 = {h : [U ]→ [L]}, where U is a large positive integer (note that these are not
locality-sensitive).
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The choice of a two-level hashing is inspired by the treatment in [31] where the authors
show that a two level hashing can simultaneously lead to linear storage complexity as well
as constant worst case retrieval time complexity compared to single level hashing (where one
typically trades off storage space vs retrieval time). In addition, to avoid collisions, the range
of a single hash would have to be very large. On the other hand, the two level structure
does not require the first hash function to be collision-free, and this helps with the storage vs
retrieval tradeoff.
Additionally, we first choose two large integers r and l, a string r′ of length l and the MD5
hash function [33] (denoted as Cr : Σ
M+l → [2r]) to transform the database strings. Once
H is created on the server, it publicly declares the hash functions hr and hs as well as the
constant string r′ it generated. Details of the construction of H using Exact-Fetch-Prep
are shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Exact-Fetch-Prep(D): Creating two-level data structure H
Input: Database D
Output: Hash table with two level hashes H, hashing functions hr, hs and string r′
1 begin
2 Choose: (a) large positive integers r and l, (b) arbitrary string r′ of length l, and (c) collision resistant
cryptographic hash function Cr : Σl+M → 2r .
3 De ← φ
4 forall x′ ∈ D do
5 x← r′ ◦ x′ (◦ denotes the concatenation operator)
6 De ← De ∪ {x}
7 do
8 hr ∼ Uniform(H2)
9 forall i = 1, ..., L do
10 Bi = {x ∈ De : hr(x) = i}
11 b(i)← |Bi|
12 while
∑L
i=1 b
2
i ≤ 4|D|
13 do
14 hs ∼ Uniform(H2)
15 while ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ L and ∀ x, y ∈ Bi, hs(x) 6= hs(y)
16 Initialize array H of size L2 + L.
17 forall x ∈ De do
18 H[L · hr(x) + hs(x)] = {Cr(x) and other data associated with x}
19 return (H, hs, hr, r′)
We now show two properties that Exact-Fetch-Prep satisfies. First, it identifies the
two hash functions hr, hs that lead to no collisions with high probability. And second, it
constructs H in expected polynomial time and uses O(|D|) storage. In particular, building on
the analysis in [31], the probability for random hash functions hr and hs to be successful (i.e.,
have no collisions) in the first and second stages of Exact-Fetch-Prep can be bounded as
follows.
Lemma 4. (1) For hr ∈ H2, Pr[
∑16|D|
i=1 b
2
i ≤ 4|D|] ≥
1
2 , where bi corresponds to the counts
of collisions in each hash bucket i. (2) Functions hr, hs ∈ H2 succeed with no collisions with
a probability ≥ 3/4.
Proof. Proof of Part (1) is similar to the analysis in [31]. For Part (2), we have the following.
Define the following random variable:
Xi = | {(x, y)| x 6= y, x, y ∈ {pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ |D|} ,
hr(x) = hr(y) = i, hs(x) = hs(y)} |.
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Further, let X =
∑16·|D|
i Xi. If X > 0, then the two level hashing of Algorithm 5 fails. If
we show that Pr[|X| ≤ 1/2] ≥ 1 − 1/4 = 3/4, then it would imply that |X| = 0 (as X is a
natural number) and the two level hashing succeeds with high probability.
For a randomly chosen hash function hs ∈ H2, we have that for any x, y, Pr[hs(x) =
hs(y)] =
1
16|D| . We estimate the expected value of random variable X:
E[Xi] ≤
(
|Bi|
2
)
1
16|D|
=
|Bi|(|Bi| − 1)
32 · |D|
,
where Bi is the hash bucket corresponding to index i with size bi.
Thus, the expected number of colliding pairs summed up over all buckets is
E[X] = E[
∑
Xi] ≤
16|D|∑
i=1
b2i
32 · |D|
.
Since
∑16|D|
i=1 b
2
i ≤ 4|D|, therefore E[X] ≤
1
8 and Pr[X ≥ 1/2] ≤
E[X]
1/2 . Or, Pr[X ≤ 1/2] ≥
1− 1/4 = 3/4.
Lemma 5. The data structure H, can be constructed by Exact-Fetch-Prep in expected
polynomial time.
Query Stage
Given H on the server-side, we do a linear scan on the server-side at query-time to retrieve
the consequents of applicable rules. A basic building block that is used in the linear scan is
the retrieval of a single element from H. We discuss this first.
To query whether a string str is present in H, one can compute the following quantities:
x = r′ ◦ str (◦ denotes the concatenation operator), and index i = L · hr(x) + hs(x). We
can then fetch the indexed element H[i] including one of its attributes H[i].Cr(x
′) (here x′
corresponds to the string present at location i). This attribute can be used to verify if str was
indeed present in the database. If a client sends a query for the presence of an element str to
a server that only holds H, then the client can have limited privacy. In particular, the server
does not know what str is, although it knows the index i and the element was returned (which
may not contain the str itself). Since the hashes are not invertible, it affords partial privacy
as the client is not revealing its string str. Exact-Fetch-Query (Algorithm 6) implements
this query process.
Algorithm 6: Exact-Fetch-Query(str): Query data structure H
Input: Query string str, and data structure H from Algorithm 5
Output: Value in H corresponding to query
1 begin
2 Client C computes x = r′ ◦ str, hr(x) and hs(x).
3 C computes i = L · hs(x) + hr(x).
4 C queries server S for entry at index i in H. Server returns H[i].
The algorithm description for querying the server under the TOP-Assoc(k,w, t, f) crite-
rion is provided in Algorithm 7 (the algorithms for TOP-1-Assoc, TOP-K-Assoc, ALL-
Assoc and ANY-Assoc are similar, hence omitted).
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Algorithm 7: Exact-TOP-Assoc-Query(T ,H): Query with TOP-Assoc criterion
Input: Transaction T , data structure H from Algorithm 5, threshold weight w ∈ Z+, antecedent length
parameter t ∈ Z+, output size parameter k ∈ Z+, and ordering function f .
Output: Set of k consequents of applicable association rules L
1 begin
2 Initialize Lall ← φ
3 Do parallel{
4 forall pi ⊂ T & |pi| ≤ t & wi ≥ w do
5 q ← Exact-Fetch-Query(pi) (Algorithm 6, ignoring the client/server distinction)
6 if q = φ then
7 continue
8 else
9 Lall.add(q)
10 }End parallel
11 L ← first k elements from sort(Lall, f) (break ties arbitrarily if needed)
12 return L
5 Privacy-preserving Protocols
We address three related privacy-preserving tasks in sequence. First, we discuss how the
Oblivious transfer protocol is a solution to privacy-preserving database query problem. We
present how consequents of all applicable association rules for a given criterion can be fetched
and collated in privacy preserving manner. Finally, we discuss how the protocol can be
extended to the setting when we use the approximate algorithms from Section 3 for fetching.
Private Protocol for Database Lookup
Consider the following two party task: a client C has an index i, and a server S has a database
D represented as a vector −→v [1 : |D] of |D| elements. The client’s goal fetch the ith element
−→v [i] such that: (a) the client learns nothing more than the element it fetched from the server,
and (b) the server learns nothing about client’s query. Specifically, this leads to the following
definition for oblivious transfer (OT):
Definition 3. An oblivious transfer(OT) protocol is one in which C retrieves the ith element
from S holding [1, . . . , n] elements iff the following conditions hold:
(1) The ensembles V iewS(S(
−→v ), C(i)) and V iewS(S(
−→v ), C(j)) are computationally indistin-
guishable for all pairs (i, j), where the random variable V iewS refers to the transcript of the
server created by the execution of the protocol.
(2) There is a (probabilistic polynomial time) simulator Sim, such that for any query element
c, the ensembles Sim(c,−→v [c]) and V iewC(S(
−→v ), C(c)) are computationally indistinguishable.
We use the notation OT[C : i, S : [1, . . . , |D|]] to represent the above Protocol in Defini-
tion 3. Without going into the details of OT implementation, we make the design choice to
use a fast and parallel implementation described in [34]. This scheme is based on length pre-
serving additive homo-morphic encryption, described next. Homo-morphic encryption with
public key pk, of message m, is denoted as c = Epk(m). Decryption with private key sk is
denoted as m = Dsk(c). Any operation over the cipher text, will also be reflected in the
decrypted plain text. For instance, let c1 and c2 be two cipher texts such that c1 = Epk(m1)
and c2 = Epk(m2). Let + represent a binary operation. Then, c1 + c2 = Epk(m1 + m2).
Further-more, the scheme is length preserving so that an l-bit input is mapped to an input of
size l +N , where N is a constant.
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We now discuss how to answer the question of whether a string str is in D in a privacy-
preserving manner. Recall the data structure H output by Exact-Fetch-Prep (see Sec-
tion 4) in which C fetches an element from database stored with S. We can readily get a
stronger privacy-preserving protocol for the same, by employing the OT protocol from Defini-
tion 3. That is, by a single execution of OT between client C and server S, C can privately fetch
the Cr-hash of string r
′ ◦ str, stored in record H[D · hr(r
′ ◦ str)+ hs(r
′ ◦ str)].Cr(). Note that
for two strings str, str′, it may be that hr(r
′ ◦str) = hr(r
′ ◦str′), and hs(r
′◦str) = hs(r
′ ◦str′).
Yet the corresponding Cr-hashes of str and str
′ may not be equal. Thus, the choice of using
a Cr-hash leads to the following guarantee on the OT based protocol.
Lemma 6. There exists a two party protocol Private-Exact-Fetch-Query such that:
(1) C learns whether str ∈ D with high probability given the description of associated hash
functions (hr, hs), and (2) the computationally bounded S learns nothing.
Private Protocol based on Exact Algorithms
A client computes an ordered list of recommended items from a set of consequents of all
applicable association rules, chosen according to some selection criteria. We break down the
process of making this recommendation process private into the following subtasks.
(1) Expunge infrequent items and anonymize item list: Firstly, note that only a few items
from the client’s transaction may be frequent and belong to any rule. So, it is important for
the client to remove all infrequent items from its transaction before further processing. The
task (denoted Preprocess, see Algorithm 8) is to remove infrequent items, and anonymize
the input transaction of the client. We assume that the initial list of items are given identifiers
from the range [|I|], which are publicly available (hence available to the client).
(2) Privately fetch and privately, interactively collate applicable association rules: We need
to select applicable rules according to the given criterion, and given the consequents of these
applicable rules along with their respective weights, we need to privately collate them to
produce a list of recommended items using these weights. For this, the client is given a list of
identities, with associated weights (which are homo-morphically encrypted), that are obtained
from the selection of rules. Client C and server S interactively execute a two-party private
sorting (denoted Private-Two-Party-Sort, see Algorithm 10) to sort the list of items
using their encrypted weights, and the client finally produces an ordered list of recommended
items at its end, sorted according to their weights.
(3) De-anonymize and recommend: Given a final list of k′ anonymized item identities, we
de-anonymize them to obtain the actual names of the recommended items. For this, the client
C fetches their actual identifiers by executing OT (see Definition 3), with the server S (similar
to Preprocess above) on the reverse mapping (RT , see Algorithm 8), and obtain the true
identifiers of the items to be recommended.
The above steps are captured in Protocol 9, which builds on the exact implementation
of ALL-Assoc(w, t) from Section 4. For brevity, we discuss the special case when t = |I|.
This protocol makes use of the Private-Exact-Fetch-Query(p) algorithm (see above) as
a subroutine. After its execution, the client C fetches all association rules with weights ≥ w in
a privacy preserving manner, and from these rules, it collates the list of recommended items.
The private versions of the exact implementations of TOP-Assoc(k,w, t), TOP-1-Assoc(f),
TOP-K-Assoc(f) and ANY-Assoc(k,w, t) can be designed in a similar manner.
We note that the above process ensures privacy of the client data with respect to the
server, and the privacy of server’s data with respect to the client, by only revealing the
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relevant consequents of association rules to the client. A much simpler privacy preserving
protocol may be devised, if only the privacy of the clients data (transaction T ) is to be
guaranteed, with respect to the server.
Protocol 8: Pre-processing and Anonymization
Input: C holds Transaction set T and S holds itemset I
Output: Item identifiers
1 begin
2 Server Preprocessing begin
3 pi
Random
←−−−−−−−−−
permutation
from [1, . . . , |I|].
4 T ← table with |I|+ 1 entries
5 Store pi in T such that T [i] = pi(i).
6 Map item I′ ∈ I to inf , where freq(I′) <θ.
7 T [inf ]← 0.
8 Let RT be the reverse map i.e., RT ◦ T (i) = i, ∀ frequent items.
9 C has transaction T = {i1, i2, i3, . . . , i|T |} comprising of all table entries and S has the table T .
10 C and S execute OT (see Definition 3), with C seeking table entries T [ii, i2, . . . , i|T |]
11 S randomly permutes the output of the OT before sending to the client C.
12 C receives the outputs of the OT from S, decrypts all outputs, and discards all inf entries, corresponding
to infrequent items.
Protocol 9: Private-Exact-ALL-Assoc-Query(w, t = |I|)
Input: Client: Transaction T
Input: Server: Threshold weight w, data structure H containing D association rules
Output: Client: Set of recommended items Irec
1 begin
2 C ↔ S Preprocess for anonymizing T
3 C
A[1..t]
←−−−− S : Call Private-Exact-Fetch-Query (Lemma 6) for t = |T | times.
4 C ↔ S : Execute Private-Two-Party-Sort (Algorithm 10) based on whether the weight of the associated
rule is ≥ w.
5 C
L
←− S; where L is the list of association rules sorted according to their weights
6 C collates the consequents of rules in L, and calculates Irec
Details of Privacy-preserving Sorting Protocol. We now discuss the details of Private-
Two-Party-Sort mentioned above. It is based on a primitive that makes n1.5 pairwise
comparisons, which are chosen at the pre-processing phase and dependent only on value of
n (in our case, n = |D|). Using [35], S produces the identities of the m = c · n1.5 pairs,
knowing the comparisons of which one can execute the oblivious sorting algorithm Private-
Two-Party-Sort in one shot. It is detailed in Protocol 10, and takes only two rounds
of communications, with a communication complexity of O(n1.5) per round. We recap the
properties of the primitive used in the protocol below.
Theorem 3 ([35]). There exists a deterministic pair of algorithms (AKS1, AKS2), which
satisfy the following:
(1) Given input n, AKS1 produces a list Ln of O(n
1.5) pair of indexes (i, j).
(2) Given an input list of integers In = a1, a2, . . . , ai, . . . , an and value of comparisons of
(ai, aj) for all (i, j) ∈ Ln, |Ln| = n
1.5, deterministic algorithm AKS2 sorts the input list In.
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Protocol 10: Private-Two-Party-Sort: Private two party sorting
Input: C has pair of values V
Input: S has identities
Output: C arranges V in sorted form
1 begin
2 C{
3 Let the pairs of these index of V be (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) using AKS1.
4 Weight(xi, yi)← (Txi , Tyi)
5 (T ′xi , T
′
yi
)
Enc
←−−− (Txi , Tyi)
6 (Exi , Eyi)← (Rand(T
′
xi
, T ′yi) (Rand in Algorithm 11)
7 P
sort
←−−− (Exi , Eyi ), i = 1, . . . , m
8 }
9 C
P
−→ S
10 S: D = (d1, . . . , dn), di
Dec
←−−− pi, pi ∈ P
11 S : val ← compare values of D
12 C
val
←−− S
13 C then applies the AKS2 algorithm to sort P .
Algorithm 11: Rand: Randomization of an encrypted data pair
Input: Data pair (T1, T2)
Output: Randomize encrypted data pairs (E1, E2)
1 begin
2 Let T1, T2 ∈ Zt
3 (a1, b1), (a2, b2)
random
←−−−−−− Zt
4 E1, E2 ← (a1.T1 + b1, a2.T2 + b2) where E ∈ Zt, such that E1, E2 preserves order of T1 and T2
Private Protocol based on Approximate Algorithms
A few modifications are needed to the previous protocol when working with data structures
designed in Section 3. Recall the functioning of Approx-GSCS-Prep and Approx-GSCS-
Query: Server chooses l random maps (l =
∑M
m=1 Lm · Km), where the i
th map funci,
maps a set T , represented as a characteristic vector T of length |I|, to a string Ti of k (say
k = maxm=1,...,M Km) bits. Thus, each antecedent pi of our rules (for 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|) is mapped
to l strings p1, p2, . . . , pi, . . . , pl of length k bits each. For an input transaction T , an associa-
tion rule p→ q is selected if and only if any of the i maps funci(T ) exactly matches funci(p).
We then proceed along the lines of the previous private protocol by doing the following mod-
ifications.
Pre-processing the D rules: We create an enhanced database De by first choosing l
random strings r1, r2, r3, . . . , rl ∈ {0, 1}
s, where s is a security parameter (a large posi-
tive integer). We then concatenate the above random strings to the l-maps as follows:
r1 ◦ func1(pi), r2 ◦ func2(pi), . . . , rj ◦ funcj(pi), . . . , rl ◦ funcl(pi), for each 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|.
The new database De has l · |D| elements, each of which stores all relevant information for
the ARs. All strings ri ◦ func1(pi), along with corresponding consequents qi in De are stored
in H as defined by Exact-Fetch-Prep (Algorithm 5).
Pre-processing the query: The client C obtains the definition of the l maps, funci, i ∈
{1, . . . , l}, along with the random prefixes ri, which are declared publicly. It then applies the l
maps on the characteristic vector T , corresponding to its input transaction T , and computes
funci(T ), from which it prepares ri ◦ funci(T ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
Privately receiving answers to the query: C queries S for existence of each string
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ri ◦ funci(T ), for i = {1, 2, . . . , l}, with the S possessing the enhanced data structure via
Private-Exact-Fetch-Query that is based on OT (Lemma 6).
Remarks on Security Analysis. The protocols presented here are two party protocols,
executed between a client C and a server S and assume that both are honest-but-curious.
That is, they will execute the given protocols, but can be curious to know more (about the
inputs of the other party via the transcripts). The security of these protocols can be defined
along the standard Ideal/Real paradigm definitions of security, and hinges on the security
of the underlying encryption system. In the Ideal/Real paradigm, an ideal functionality is
defined which captures the desired input/output functionality for the two parties. First,
the parties submit their inputs to a TP (trusted party), and then receive some outputs.
The real protocol is said to realize this ideal functionality, if there is a PPT (probabilistic
polynomial time) simulator that can compute a distribution of views of the parties that is
indistinguishable from the distribution of views generated in the real process. If this is the
case, then the protocol is claimed to be secure. In other words, a user can assume that the
designed protocol provides security guarantees that one could imagine, as guaranteed by the
Ideal functionality.
Proofs of security of the presented protocols can be presented along these above lines. For
example, in the retrieval of an element from the data structure one would need to capture
what is learned by the server about the client’s input T and like-wise by the client about
server’s database of D association rules. This could be the number of consequents fetched,
crypto-hash of some antecedent of fetched association rule, size of the client input etc., and
this collection is defined as the outputs of the respective parties. A simulation based proof
can then proceed along standard lines. Here, we choose to focus on the formulations of the
recommendation problem and approaches to solve it efficiently as well as securely and omit the
elaborate proofs of security (which are standard because our parties are honest-but-curious,
albeit long and relatively less insightful).
Finally, note that in our solutions, for every new client session the server S has to re-
organize the database (use a new set of hash functions in Private-Exact-Fetch-Query).
Otherwise, a client may be able to correlate the information received from the server from
multiple sessions and gain ‘unintended to be shared’ information about the association rules.
This often leads to more computation by the server per client session, and is unavoidable if
this type of information leak needs to be prevented. There is always a trade-off between the
information shared about the server’s database with client and vice-versa, and computations
done by the client/server. Our solution chooses one end of this spectrum, and many other
choices are equally valid.
6 Experimental Evaluation
Our empirical evaluations illustrate that although the computational and latency requirements
generally increase, privacy properties can still be guaranteed at roughly the same time scale
as the non-private counterparts for reasonably sized problem instances. The goal of the
experiments is to validate how the recommendation latencies are influenced as a function of
the number of rules, the selection criteria and various other problem parameters. For instance,
we know that OT does introduce measurable latency between the client and the server. But as
we show below, for moderately sized datasets ( 10000 rules for instance), the communication
overhead is quite manageable (well within a few seconds), which may be appealing for near-
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Parameter Symbol Default value Range
RSA modulus size N 1024 {1024, 2048}
Number of rules |D| 103 103 − 106
TOP-Assoc output size k 3 3− 20
TOP-Assoc length t 3 3− 10
Query size |T | 5 5− 20
Table 1: Evaluation Metrics
|D| |T | t Time |D| |T | t Time |D| |T | t Time
100K
5
3 58
500K
5
3 229
1M
5
3 744
5 69 5 273 5 931
10
3 278
10
3 436
10
3 1279
5 232 5 525 5 1413
15
3 212
15
3 678
15
3 1911
5 213 5 751 5 2009
20
3 263
20
3 999
20
3 2615
5 229 5 987 5 2957
Table 2. Execution times (in milliseconds) incurred by the Exact-ALL-Assoc(w, t) algo-
rithm for fetching applicable rules. Symbols K and M denotes values 103 and 106 respectively.
real-time advertising (i.e., where time scales of the order of a few seconds are acceptable).
Experimental setup and evaluation metrics. Experiments were conducted on a laptop
equipped with a 2.5 GHz Core i5 processor and 16 gigabyte of memory running Windows 7.
All algorithms were implemented in Java version 8 update 60 with allocated heap space of 8
gigabyte. We explored the parameters listed in Table 1 over corresponding ranges to evaluate
our algorithms and their private versions. RSA modulus size N is the key size used in the
underlying crypto-system. Increasing N causes significant reduction in performance while
increasing security. To assess this trade-off, we ran experiments using both RSA1024 and
RSA2048. All the experiments were executed 1000 times to compute the amortized execution
times.
Evaluating the Exact and Approximate Algorithms
First, an exact implementation of the ALL-Assoc(w, t) criterion is evaluated. This criterion
was picked because the size of the list of rules output by the exact algorithm is larger than the
outputs of the other criteria. Further, the computational burden imposed by parameter k for
any k < |D| is negligible in terms of the total processing time. We generated synthetic datasets
and evaluated our implementation, whose median processing times are listed in Table 2. As
can be inferred, even when the number of association rules is very large (for instance, see
the entry corresponding to |D| equal to 1 million), our implementation is observed to be very
efficient.
Second, we evaluated Approx-GSCS-Query(T ,DS, f) on two real world transaction
datasets: (a) Retail [36], and (b) Accidents [37]. The retail dataset consists of market basket
data collected from an anonymous Belgian retail store for approximately 5 months during the
period 1999-2000. The number of transactions is 88163 and the number of items is 16470.
We use SPMF’s [38] implementation of FP Growth algorithm (setting minimum support and
minimum confidence values to 0.001 and 0.01 respectively) to get 16147 association rules.
The Accidents dataset consists of traffic accidents during the period 1991-2000 in Flanders,
Belgium. The number of transactions in this dataset is 340, 184. The attributes capture the
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Dataset |D| Tq (ms) |Do| To (s) A10 A16 A32
Accidents 334K 1.69 10K 27.4 68% 100% 100%
Retail 16K 1.5 10K 28 72% 100% 100%
Table 3: Performance of Approx-GSCS-Query.
circumstances in which the accidents have occurred. The total number of attributes (corre-
sponding to I) is 572. Again, we use SPMF’s [38] implementation of FP Growth algorithm
(setting minimum support and minimum confidence values to 0.5 and 0.6 respectively) to get
334566 association rules.
Note that because the quality of the recommendations depends on the quality of the
rules mined, the recommendation accuracy can vary across datasets. For the above two
datasets that we used, we held out some of the transactions in a validation set and checked
if the recommendations given using the ALL-Assoc criterion had acceptable validation set
precision (fraction of items that were correct among the recommended items). We used the
confidence of the rules as their weights. We did not cross-validate to get the best parameter
choices (weight threshold w or the antecedent length threshold t for our criterion here) as this
was not our primary goal.
Instead, we show how the latency overhead due to the private protocol varies as a function
of our system parameters below. In particular, column Tq of table 3 lists the median processing
times for a collection of predefined query transactions for these two datasets (the thresholding
parameter for antecedent length, t, was varied between 1 to 5) in the non-privacy setting.
Contrast this with the column To, which lists the median processing times with privacy on
a sub-sampled set of rules as shown in column |Do|. The reduced size of the set of rules
considered for private fetching is needed to ensure that the latencies are manageable. The
sub-sampling was based on the confidence weights of the ARs (rules with higher weights were
picked). As can be inferred, these processing times are comparable to the numbers in Table 2
in an absolute sense (seconds vs milliseconds). Columns A10, A16 and A32 provide accuracies
of Approx-GSCS-Query with hash lengths (k = maxm=1,...,M Km, see Section 3) set to 10,
16 and 32 bits respectively, averaged over 1000 queries of length 3. When the length is only
10 bits, Approx-GSCS-Query suffers from low accuracy as irrelevant association rules fall
under the same buckets. We omit more extensive results on the approximation quality for
brevity (see [13, 12] for extensive performance profiling of similar approximation schemes).
Evaluating Timing Overheads due to Privacy
Table 4 documents the timing overhead introduced by a single 1-n oblivious transfer, which
is used to make the exact implementation for ALL-Assoc privacy preserving. The number
of rules (|D|) was varied from 1 thousand to 10 thousand and the RSA modulus was varied
between 1024 and 2048. Our implementation of the oblivious transfer protocol is single
threaded and is based on [39] (a multi-threaded faster implementation can be found in [34],
which can be used as a plug-in module to improve overhead time by a factor of magnitude
or higher). From the table we can infer that for moderate sized databases, private fetching
of applicable rules is competitive and practical. For instance, to fetch applicable rules from
a database with 104 rules, the median time taken is ∼ 40 seconds for a query of size 5
(RSA modulus set to 1024). Practicality is further supported by the fact that in client server
settings applicable for many cloud based applications/world wide web, multiple servers will
be handling multiple query requests.
As discussed briefly earlier, the timing overheads incurred by the privacy preserving coun-
terpart of Approx-GSCS-Query for the real datasets is shown in Table 3 (column To). We
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N |D| |T | Time |D| |T | Time N |D| |T | Time |D| |T | Time
1024
1K
5 3.5
2K
5 6.9
2048
1K
5 25.3
2K
5 52.1
10 3.6 10 7 10 25.5 10 61
15 3.7 15 7.2 15 26 15 50
20 3.5 20 6.8 20 25.8 20 50.4
5K
5 17
10K
5 39.6
5K
5 133.1
10K
5 266.9
10 18.5 10 37.6 10 138.7 10 248.6
15 17.5 15 39.1 15 129.8 15 256.5
20 17.2 20 36.5 20 141.8 20 268.5
Table 4. Overhead times by a private protocol (see Section 5) that embeds the exact imple-
mentation of ALL-Assoc(w, t).
choose the RSA modulus value to be 1024 here. Although the processing times are now mul-
tiple orders of magnitude compared to vanilla processing times (column Tq), they are still
practical and manageable for an e-commerce setting (again, due to the fact that in practice
multiple servers service multiple queries). These times are also comparable to similar sized
datasets benchmarked in Table 4. Thus, our solutions and their private versions are very
competitive in fetching applicable association rules and making item recommendations.
7 Conclusion
Our work proposes a rich set of methods for selection and application of association rules for
recommendations that have strong theoretical basis as well as pragmatic grounding. The abil-
ity to reuse association rules that are frequently used in the industry to bootstrap a scalable
and privacy-aware recommendation system makes our solution very attractive to practitioners.
Our experiments further highlight the practicality of achieving privacy preserving recommen-
dations for moderate to large-scale e-commerce applications.
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